Institut Veblen / Veblen Institute

The EU mirror measure on antibiotics in livestock farming could result in Brazil losing all access to the European market for meat

Mathilde Dupré & Stéphanie Kpenou — 2026-05-13T09:04:18Z

A new ban on the use of growth-promoting antibiotics in livestock farming for meat imported into the EU will enter into force in September 2026, and currently, Brazil is not among the exporting countries able to guarantee compliance with European requirements. The country has been removed from the list, updated on 12 May, of third countries authorised to export meat and animal products to the EU (1).

This mirror measure aimed at combating the scourge of antimicrobial resistance was adopted in 2019 and will only enter into force on 2 September 2026 — more than seven years later (2). The measure extends to operators in third countries exporting animals or products of animal origin to the European Union the prohibition, already applicable within the EU since 2006, on the use of antibiotics as growth promoters in livestock farming. In order to be imported into the EU, animal products must be accompanied by an official certificate of compliance and originate from a third country included on a list of approved third countries (3).

The absence of Brazil from the list published on Tuesday, 12 May by the European authorities of countries currently authorised to export meat to the EU is a real bombshell, coming just days after the start of the provisional application of the EU-Mercosur trade agreement, which is specifically intended to increase these flows of beef and poultry meat in particular.

Brazil can still bring itself into compliance by September. To do so, it will notably have to adopt new rules, monitor their implementation and ensure transparency throughout the value chains of its meat sectors. However, the date from which such changes could trigger a reauthorisation of exports also depends on production timelines for the first animals that have never received antibiotics as growth promoters.

The reactions of the Brazilian authorities are not yet known. The country does, however, have several avenues of recourse to challenge the application of this European text, notably through the rebalancing mechanism of the EU/Mercosur trade agreement, which entered into provisional application on 1 May.

Notes
(1) The list of authorised countries is available at this link.
(2) See the study by the Institut Veblen, When Will Imports of Meat from Animals Doped with Growth-Promoting Antibiotics Finally End?, June 2024.
(3) In addition to the very long delays in the implementation of this mirror measure, the practical arrangements for its implementation have considerably weakened its scope. A first delegated regulation intended to define the conditions for implementation was published on 27 February 2023 (although it should have been adopted before 28 January 2022). This regulation requires imported animal products to be accompanied by an official certificate of compliance with the prohibition laid down in Regulation 2019/6. These products must also originate from a third country or a region of a third country appearing on a list of approved third countries. The first implementing act (published only on 29 January 2024) provides for an obligation on operators in third countries to complete a self-declaration certifying that the meat complies with the prohibition established by European legislation. This obligation will only enter into force as of 3 September 2026. For the measure to become fully applicable, it still remained necessary to update the list of third countries approved to export their animal products to the European Union. Furthermore, the French authorities had long feared that the measure would only cover antibiotics administered as veterinary medicinal products and not as feed additives, which would represent only a tiny fraction of the uses by producers in third countries exporting their meat to the EU. However, the European Commission reportedly confirmed last February that, despite its scope formally relating to veterinary medicinal products, the text would indeed cover both uses.

Money & Finance Programme

2026-05-04T10:52:02Z

"New Approaches in Transition Finance" as a project run our the Money & Finance" Program in coopération with the Chair "Energie & Prospérité" at Institut Louis Bachelier. It is supported by the Charles-Léopold Mayer Foundation and the European Climate Foundation,

Publications and events linked to this project

Members of the working group

Introduction
We urgently need to broaden the policy debate about how to finance investments in decarbonization and other strategic objectives, as underinvestment is one of the main reasons why EU countries seem unable to get on the right track to attain the goals they set themselves. Transition policies are being increasingly impeded by contradictions and trade-offs between main political objectives such as fiscal sustainability, security, international competitiveness and – further and further down the road – green investments.

From the first announcements of the European Green Deal in 2019/20, doubts were expressed about whether it was possible to pursue ambitious transition policies without a general reform of EU's macroeconomic governance. But things got much worse in recent years with the rapidly changing economic and geopolitical environment, in particular the new Trump administration's climate and environment hostile policies. Europe faces now a much more complex global economy, having to compete with China on all clean tech fronts and beyond, while simultaneously dealing with new geopolitical risks and being heavily exposed to US financial markets, where increasingly different rules of the game apply.

As a result, conditions are set for a “a perfect storm for 2025-2030” , in the field of green investments but also in strategic sectors and reshoring global value chains. On the national level, many countries such as France face increasing fiscal pressure, and cuts already affect green investments negatively. On the EU level, the main source of EU-grants for decarbonization (the Recovery and Resilience Facility) is running out, additional funding remains limited and focused on defense, whereas unflexible fiscal rules remain inconducive to public green investments.

The political thrust lies currently on reviving the Capital Markets Union; i.e. on the savings and investments union (SIU) presented by the EC in March 2025, while other options do not obtain much attention. Some suggested SIU reforms within the framework are promising – European long-term savings and investments accounts, cross-border supervision, common and enforceable ESG standards, increased use of loan guarantees provided national promotional banks/EIB and the European Stability Mecanism (ESM) to encourage long-term investment – while others seem questionable from the point of view of financial stability and productive use of funds – securitization, alleviated prudential regulations. But the main point is that SIU will unlikely solve the investment problem by itself; at the very best it can be a part of the solution.

One reason for this lies in the fact that, in spite of years of debates and a series of action plans and legislative measures, the EU still lacks an effective sustainable finance framework capable of guiding private investments where they are needed . The other lies in international finance. “Bringing back” savings and investments – the overarching objective stated in Letta, Draghi and Noyer reports – is easier said than done in a globalized financial system, in which capital flows are free and the US remains the dominant financial center with the dominant currency.

Most importantly, the implicit or explicit assumption behind the SIU is that Europe will “bring back” savings and investments by closing the competitiveness gap with US financial centers, becoming just as interesting for potential investors. But this looks likely only to a limited extent; on one hand, US remains in a dominant position and engages in aggressive deregulation while the Trump administration flags for a strategic use of finance for geopolitical purposes . On the other hand, the very nature of investments needed call for a strong public finance component, as the risk-profit profile does not interest private investors – otherwise these investments would have been realized already. In other words, “unlocking” capital markets might increase investments in some segments of economy but not necessarily in the right ones. And yet, tools for directing strategic investment already exist in specific sectors, for instance the French SMEs in the defense sector receive special financial assistance to counterbalance low profitability, and financially fragile positions that characterize this strategic sector.

This is the main rationale for proposing more and alternative financial tools and regulations for developing strategic sectors, reshoring value chains and green investments: they are all concerned by a potential mismatch between specific financial needs and what the SIU arguably can achieve. The Draghi report invited EU to develop an active economic strategy and economic planning of a new kind, but SIU proposals reflect the “old” world, leaving key allocation decisions to the markets.

Call for an EU-wide windfall profit mechanism in response to the energy crisis

Madeleine Péron — 2026-04-16T11:19:50Z

In a letter to EU Commission president von der Leyen, a group of NGOs including Veblen Institute say a windfall profit tax on oil companies is needed to support vulnerable households, industry, and the clean energy transition.

The European Union is once again confronted with a severe energy crisis, driven by war and the escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, with direct consequences for global fossil fuel markets. The first days of the current crisis have already imposed significant additional costs on European economies and citizens, further exacerbating cost-of-living pressures and energy insecurity and cost € billions in additional energy imports. To be precise, in just the first 30 days of the conflict, the EU's fossil fuel import bill has increased by approximately €14 billion.

At the same time, major fossil fuel companies are recording extraordinary billions of euros in excess profits, a substantial portion of them generated within Europe by refiners and distributors.

This situation echoes the circumstances that led to the adoption of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854, which introduced a temporary solidarity contribution on excess profits in the fossil fuel sector. That instrument demonstrated both the feasibility and effectiveness of coordinated EU-level action. An assessment by the European Commission calculated that total revenue collection was in the order of €28 billion during the fiscal years of 2022 and 2023.

In light of the current crisis and the EU's long-term climate and security objectives, it is necessary to reintroduce and strengthen such a mechanism at Union level, complementing Member States' efforts, to generate revenues to support vulnerable households, industry, and the clean energy transition.

We therefore call upon the European Commission to:

Propose a renewed EU-wide windfall profit tax, building on Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854, under Article 122(1) TFEU or an appropriate legal basis, to ensure a coordinated and timely response to the current energy crisis. The design of the solidarity contribution should be strengthened, including by increasing the share of excess profits captured, in order to better reflect the scale of windfall gains observed in the fossil fuel sector and ensure a fair contribution from those benefiting most from the crisis;

Expand the scope of the mechanism to address profits generated by international fossil fuel companies, including those not headquartered in the EU but deriving significant revenues from the European market, exploring all available legal and fiscal instruments to ensure comprehensive coverage;

Ensure that revenues are clearly and transparently earmarked for socially and environmentally beneficial purposes, including targeted support for vulnerable households, investment in energy efficiency, and accelerated deployment of renewable energy and electrification solutions;

Embed the mechanism within a broader strategy to reduce Europe's dependence on fossil fuels, ensuring that crisis response measures are aligned with the EU's climate objectives and contribute to a faster, fairer transition to a clean energy system.

The time has come to put an end to the structural vulnerabilities of Europe's reliance on fossil fuels. A robust, EU-level windfall profit mechanism would not only ensure fairness in times of crisis but also reinforce public trust by demonstrating that extraordinary profits are being redirected towards the common good.

We urge the European Commission and Member States to act swiftly and decisively, and to take into account our recommendations ahead of the package of measures to tackle the energy crisis, to be unveiled on 22 April 2026, as well as ahead of the informal European Council on 23–24 April 2026.

View online : Read our joint letter

Toward a Sustainable European Industrial Policy: Tools and Levers

Madeleine Péron — 2026-03-18T15:07:15Z

Europe does not have to choose between competitiveness and the environment. It must build its competitiveness on the ecological transition, or it will fail on both fronts.

One year after the Draghi report, the European Commission is embarking on a dangerous path: abandoning the environmental objectives of the Green Deal in the name of short-term competitiveness, while failing to guarantee the Union's strategic autonomy or economic security.

Under the guise of administrative simplification, what is actually taking place is genuine deregulation. The Commission's first measures reflect trade-offs that are systematically unfavourable to the climate, the environment and social justice. The result: Europe is moving no closer to any of its objectives — neither ecological nor economic. The Commission is offering a false choice between competitiveness, economic security and the environment, when an integrated approach is indispensable.

The Draghi report itself called for greater coherence between the Union's economic, trade and financial policies. Yet the European Commission has not yet translated this call into action. Tools already exist to reconcile ecological transition and competitiveness. The current industrial momentum opens a window of opportunity: the European Union is relaxing its competition doctrine and equipping itself with the means for a more strategic economic policy.

This note examines the real coherence and effectiveness of the proposed policy mix, and sets out proposals to enable the European Union to reconcile its climate, environmental and competitiveness objectives.

Six levers for a sustainable European Industrial Policy

1- Steer industrial policy by integrating economic, environmental and social dimensions
2- Make public support conditional on environmental and social criteria
3- Cooperate on European industrial projects aligned with the transition, such as the small electric vehicle
4- Green public procurement to drive industrial transformation
5- Make full use of the new trade defence tools and ambitiously implement all the instruments of the Green Shield (strengthened requirements for access to the EU market)
6- Increase and strategically direct public and private investment

Joint civil society and cities letter on the revision of the CO2 emission standards for cars and vans

2026-03-17T10:13:15Z

Ahead of a meeting of EU Environment Ministers, 34 organisations call for the ambition of the 2030 and 2035 targets to be maintained.

Dear Climate and Environment Ministers of the European Union,

Cars are responsible for 14% of all greenhouse gas emissions in Europe and air pollution is still linked to over 182,000 deaths in the EU per year, according to the European Environment Agency with a strong exposure of the EU population in urban areas. The solution to both climate damage and toxic air pollution is already available and is soon to become the go-to option for consumers to reduce their mobility costs. Light-duty electric vehicles offer the opportunity to cost-effectively replace the polluting internal combustion engine (ICE) and usher in a new era of zero-emission mobility.

For more than a decade, EU CO₂ standards for cars have been the single most effective policy instrument to reduce road transport emissions, improve air quality and drive the transformation of Europe's automotive industry. They are not only a climate tool. They have become the backbone of Europe's industrial strategy for clean mobility, giving direction to investments in electric vehicles, batteries, charging infrastructure and European manufacturing capacity. The clarity and predictability of the targets have triggered unprecedented industrial investments and positioned Europe on the path toward zero-emission mobility. These investments are now trickling down with a renewed perspective for consumers to find affordable electric vehicles, at a time where high prices pushed many of them away from the new car market.

However, despite their proven effectiveness, the EU CO₂ standards for cars and vans have been subjected to sustained pressure from some industries. In December 2025, the European Commission reopened the regulation and proposed a revision that would significantly lower its ambition through the removal of a phase out date and the introduction of multiple new flexibilities. This shift risks weakening one of the EU's most effective climate instruments, jeopardising industrial, societal, and environmental progress made to achieve the EU's competitiveness and resilience objectives. At a time of escalating climate and energy crises, weakening the car CO₂ standards would be a serious mistake that undermines Europe's strategic autonomy and prolongs its dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Overall, flexibilities will lead manufacturers to postpone action, leading to higher emissions and undermining investment certainty in batteries, charging networks and across the e-mobility value chain. The proposed flexibilities open the door to biofuels and e-fuels which have no role in decarbonising cars and vans and should be excluded from the regulation. Averaging compliance over 2030-2032 would, in practice, slow down the electric vehicles market at the moment when it needs to scale up rapidly.

We therefore call on national governments to:

Reject any weakening of the 2030 target ambition to secure rapid mass adoption of electric cars,

Support the end of the sale of new petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2035 to ensure that the regulation remains aligned with the EU's climate and industrial objectives.

Yours sincerely,

T&E, BEUC, Eurocities, Polis, ERS, EEB, International Federation of Pedestrians, VCÖ – Mobilität mit Zukunft (Austria), Bond Beter Leefmilieu (Belgium), Les Chercheurs d'Air (Belgium), Veblen Institute for Economic Reforms (France), Réseau Action Climat (France), Fondation pour la Nature et l'Homme (France), Canopea (France), Germanwatch (Germany), Nabu (Germany), DUH (Germany), Kyoto Club (Italy), Legambiente (Italy), Nuove Ri-Generazioni (Italy), Greenpeace Italia (Italy), Cittadini per l'aria onlus (Italy), Adiconsum (Italy), Forum Disuguaglianze e Diversità (Italy), Natuur & Milieu (Netherlands), Parent in the City Foundation (Poland), Zero (Portugal), Focus Association for sustainable development (Slovenia), Coalition for sustainable transport policies (KTPP) (Slovenia), Ecologistas en Acción (Spain), Fundación Ecología y Desarrollo (ECODES) (Spain), VCS Verkehrs-Club der Schwei (Suisse), LIVE + BREATHE (UK), Mums for Lungs (UK).

US banks set to face lower capital requirements : a further step towards deregulation

Wojtek Kalinowski — 2026-03-13T10:45:10Z

Banks “credit to the real economy” claim is not backed by evidence, but its works well politically in the current landscape.

By Wojtek Kalinowski, Veblen Institute for Economic Reforms

This policy breif is a part of the "New approaches in transition finance" project

On March 12, 2026, Michelle W. Bowman, the Federal Reserve's Vice Chair for Supervision, announced proposals to overhaul capital requirements for large US banks. In practice, this means a reduction in capital requirements for the eight largest US banks, including JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Goldman Sachs.

This decision is likely to be seized upon by those in Europe already pushing for lighter capital requirements in the name of international competitiveness. The EU Council is already calling for a “simplification” of financial services regulation, including the prudential framework. In February 2026, German and French Finance Ministers Lars Klingbeil and Roland Lescure wrote to Commissioner Albuquerque calling for an ambitious EU-wide “financial services simplification package”.

This political pressure is building at precisely the moment when the Commission is preparing its report on banking sector competitiveness, in response to a call for evidence to which we submitted a response.

On one hand, the Fed is at last completing the US transposition of Basel III standards, which represents genuine progress towards international regulatory convergence. On the other, it is using this exercise in compliance to introduce several substantial easings that cut against the very prudential logic these standards are designed to reinforce.

The G-SIB surcharge reduction : a decision without evidential foundation
The most contestable element of Bowman's announcement is the downward revision of the surcharge imposed on globally systemically important banks (G-SIB surcharge). Bowman justifies this reduction on the grounds that the coefficients used to calculate the surcharge have not been updated since 2015 and have thus “drifted” from the international methodology. She proposes indexing these coefficients to economic growth, on the basis that balance sheet expansion in line with GDP does not reflect a genuine increase in systemic risk.

This argument deserves scrutiny. The size of large US banks has not merely grown in line with the economy : it has also been accompanied by deepening interconnections with the non-bank financial sector, greater exposure to derivatives markets, and increasing complexity in trading activities. The IMF (October 2025) and the ECB/ESRB (January and February 2026) have explicitly flagged that these interdependencies act as amplifiers of systemic shocks. Reducing the G-SIB surcharge in this context means lightening the safety buffer of precisely those institutions whose failure is most likely to trigger a system-wide crisis.

The “credit to the real economy” claim is not backed by evidence
Bowman's central argument is that “excessive” capital requirements constrain lending to households and businesses, and therefore hamper growth, employment and living standards. The rhetoric is well-worn, the metaphor convenient. Her speech bears a telling title—“Capital Rules for the Real Economy”—that presupposes what it would need to prove.

Independent academic research does not support this claim. An ECB study (Behn & Reghezza, 2025) covering large euro area banks between 2019 and 2024 finds that capital requirements have no statistically significant effect on profit efficiency, and that the CET1 level that would maximise productive efficiency is around 18%—well above current levels. A Discussion Paper Bundesbank Discussion Paper (2025) covering US and European banks reaches the same conclusion : no negative link between capital ratios and profitability. The Financial Policy Committee reaffirmed in December 2025 that better-capitalised banks are, on the contrary, more stable lenders across the economic cycle.

The causal chain Bowman invokes—lower capital equals more credit to the real economy—is not empirically documented. What is documented, on the other hand, is that large US banks announced record shareholder returns in 2025, with share buybacks and dividends exceeding $120 billion. Capital requirements have clearly not prevented generous shareholder payouts ; there is no evidence that further easing will translate into lending rather than further distributions.

The SVB lesson already forgotten
Less than three years ago, the failure of Silicon Valley Bank illustrated precisely what regulatory rollback—presented, again, as a proportionality measure—can produce in practice. In 2018, raising the systemic threshold from $50bn to $250bn in assets removed SVB from enhanced Fed supervision, a decision presented at the time as reasonable and targeted. The outcome was a bank failure requiring emergency public intervention that briefly threatened the stability of the US financial system. The speed with which this episode appears to have left institutional memory is itself cause for concern.

Public procurement as a strategic tool for the green and just transition

Madeleine Péron — 2026-01-20T16:45:39Z

How to ensure that public procurement is wisely directed towards a more sustainable economy ?

Based on our work on Industrial policy and ecological transition, we welcome the initiative of the Commission to align public procurement directives with broader social, environmental and strategic goals.

Public procurement should be fully recognised as a strategic policy instrument at the heart of the European Unions ecological, social and industrial transition.

The revision of EU public procurement rules is a decisive opportunity to:

make green and socially responsible public procurement the default option across the EU;
integrate total cost and life-cycle approaches, rather than price-only criteria;
better connect public procurement with industrial strategy, innovation and employment objectives;
facilitate cooperation, mutualisation and coordination at European and territorial levels.

Given its scale and market-shaping power, simplification of procurement rules must not lead to weaker standards, but rather to greater legal certainty, clearer expectations for contracting authorities and bidders, and stronger implementation capacity.

By making sustainable procurement the default through genuine simplification, systematizing life-cycle approaches, explicitly connecting procurement to industrial strategy, enabling multi-level mutualisation, and introducing progressive EU content requirements linked to sustainability, the EU can transform €616 billion in annual spending into a powerful engine of transition, and pretend to even more impact through lower levels of procurement.

The revision of EU public procurement rules is a critical juncture to align public spending with the Union's ecological, social and industrial ambitions. The current moment—with the Clean Industrial Deal, Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act, and clear political commitment to strategic autonomy—offers unprecedented opportunity for transformation to the benefit of citizens, workers and future generations.

Photo de Waldemar Brandt sur Unsplash

Open letter to the European Parliament on the digital euro: “let the public interest prevail”

Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran — 2026-01-12T15:15:54Z

Our scientific advisor Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran is one of seventy European economists and policy experts calling on members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to back a digital euro that serves the public interest, arguing that it is crucial for Europe's monetary sovereignty and for guaranteeing access to central bank money in an increasingly cash light economy.

The Veblen Institute advocates since 2023 for a digital euro with a strong public option, diffuse directly by the ECB or by public financial institutions, in addition to commercial banks. Otherwise, private stablecoins and foreign payment giants may gain even greater influence over Europe's digital payments.

The signatories, including former European Bank for Reconstruction and Development vice president José Leandro and French economist Thomas Piketty, describe the proposed central bank digital currency (CBDC) as a public good.

Download the open letter here.

Complaint against four EU Member States to put an end to investment treaties protecting frozen Russian assets

Mathilde Dupré — 2025-12-17T05:00:00Z

As EU Member States struggle to reach an agreement ahead of the European Council of 18–19 December on the use of frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine's reconstruction, the proposal is facing strong legal resistance within the EU. At issue is the growing risk of litigation based on bilateral investment treaties, already used by sanctioned Russian oligarchs and companies to claim massive compensation. While Belgium is demanding guarantees against potential legal action and Member States are slow to denounce treaties nevertheless deemed incompatible with EU law, six European organisations are filing a complaint against France, Germany, Sweden and Austria to compel Member States to put an end to them (1).

The fear of litigation through investment treaties has been explicitly invoked by the Belgian Prime Minister to justify his reluctance ahead of the European Council of Heads of State on the proposal to use Russian assets to finance a reparations loan for Ukraine. While immobilized assets belonging to Russian public institutions are mainly held by the European depository institution Euroclear, based in Belgium, other assets are reportedly held directly by commercial banks across the EU (including €18 billion in France — which may explain the French presidency's lukewarm support for the European proposal).

These concerns do not appear entirely unfounded, as the Central Bank of Russia announced on Friday 12 December that it had filed a claim before the Moscow Arbitration Court against Euroclear in an attempt to recover alleged losses. At the same time, Russian companies and Kremlin-linked oligarchs are using investment treaties to challenge the international sanctions imposed on them and to seek restitution of their assets, with compensation on top (see our European investigation published on Tuesday 9 December).

The 26 known investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases, as well as threatened claims brought against sanctions, already amount to USD 62 billion. This figure is close to the USD 70 billion in military aid provided by the EU to Ukraine since 2022. The actual amount is likely to be significantly higher, as in more than half of the cases no information is available regarding the sums claimed.

Belgium is now requesting guarantees in order to accept the use of frozen assets, in particular assurances that it would have access to funding equivalent to the entire package should it face legal proceedings or retaliation from Moscow.

How can the continued existence of investment protection treaties between EU Member States and Russia — which provide the legal basis for these proceedings — be justified after the invasion of Ukraine? (2) This question is all the more pressing given that, as early as 2009, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the investment protection treaties of Sweden, Austria and Finland were incompatible with EU law, particularly with regard to the Council's power to impose sanctions (3). Yet the three Member States concerned by the CJEU ruling have so far failed to remedy the situation, as even acknowledged by the Swedish government in a recent report (4). Worse still, beyond these three countries, most of the old BITs of EU Member States also lack the safeguards required by the CJEU concerning provisions on the free movement of capital.

This is why six European organisations (the Veblen Institute in France, PowerShift in Germany, Attac Austria and Friends of the Earth Sweden, with the support of Friends of the Earth Europe and the European Coalition for Trade Justice) are today filing a complaint against four Member States (France, Germany, Sweden and Austria) to demand the termination of these treaties, which violate EU law.

In December, Ursula von der Leyen suggested denouncing the investment protection treaty between Belgium and Russia. In the European Commission's proposed compromise on the reparations loan, Member States would also be invited to simultaneously terminate their bilateral investment treaties with Russia.

According to Mathilde Dupré, Co-Director of the Veblen Institute: “After climate action and the exceptional measures adopted by governments in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, national security policies are now being challenged by sanctioned foreign investors through investment arbitration. This system of exceptional justice severely restricts States' capacity to act, all the more so in a context of heightened geopolitical tensions. States can no longer afford to let it persist.”

Notes

(1) See the press kit presenting the complaint and the full text of the complaint.

(2) France itself is being sued by a sanctioned Russian investor in a dispute following the cancellation of the “Montagne d'Or” mining project in French Guiana. In addition, France is also being sued by Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, whose villa on the French Riviera was seized by French authorities following allegations of money laundering and of having acted as a front man for the sanctioned oil and gas giant Gazprom.

(3) The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued three judgments against Austria, Sweden and Finland (Cases C-118/07, Commission v Finland; C-205/06, Commission v Austria; C-249/06, Commission v Sweden), concluding that the clauses on capital transfers in extra-EU BITs conflicted with the Council's power to unilaterally impose restrictive measures on third countries under certain conditions.

(4) Swedish National Board of Trade (2024), En modernisering av Sveriges investeringsskyddsavtal.

(5) France and Germany are the EU Member States with the highest number of investment protection treaties. Most of these treaties were concluded at a time when provisions were few and rudimentary, and they do not include the safeguards now required under EU law.
Austria and Sweden have already been found by the CJEU to have failed to remove the incompatibilities between their old pre-accession BITs and EU law.
None of the four countries has brought its BITs into compliance with EU law.
This infringement complaint also targets other incompatibilities of old investment protection treaties between Member States and third countries in light of CJEU case law.
If the European Commission were to intervene regarding the old investment treaties of these Member States, the procedure could have repercussions for all investment treaties concluded by other EU Member States, as they share similar characteristics.

European Commission confirms weakening of pesticide legislation

Mathilde Dupré & Stéphanie Kpenou — 2025-12-16T08:43:00Z

On 16 December, the European Commission presented its “omnibus” proposal on food safety. While a leaked draft had revealed a significant weakening of EU health and environmental protections for pesticides, the final proposal only marginally adjusts this orientation without altering the overall logic of the text.

Maintaining the principle of unlimited approval for certain pesticides. The principle of unlimited approval would not apply to substances identified as candidates for substitution and - new compared to the leaked version - to substances for which the risk assessment reveals uncertainties or data gaps.

Confirmed reduction in Member States' margin of discretion in light of new scientific data. FSA studies will now prevail, although Member States may request the Commission to re-examine a substance and prepare a new study.

Grace periods. The Commission partly revises its initial proposal. The standard grace period remains 18 months but may be extended to 36 months if no viable alternative is available.

No concrete progress on import requirements. The proposal falls short of the leaked version, which provided for an immediate and automatic reduction in MRLs for the most dangerous substances. This measure would have covered only a quarter of the 72 substances banned in the EU and excluded many products (animal feed, processed products, etc.). In its final proposal, the Commission states that it will wait for the outcome of an impact assessment before taking concrete action on this matter, without specifying whether it refers to the impact assessment announced in November 2025 or to the general ex ante impact assessment process preceding proposals for European legislative acts.